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Arius of Treve	Master Morality and Slave Morality	#1	[url]	[-]
Posts: 522 08/17/01 22:05:43 Moderator	"The morality of Earth, from the Gorean point of view, is a morality which would be viewed as more appropriate to slaves than free men. It would be seen in terms of the envy and resentment of inferiors for their superiors. It lays great stress on equalities and being humble and being pleasant and avoiding friction and being ingratiating and small. It is a morality in the best interest of slaves, who would be only too eager to be regarded as the equals of others. We are all the same. That is the hope of slaves; that is what it is in their interest to convince others of. The Gorean morality on the other hand is more one of inequalities, based on the assumption that individuals are not the same, but quite different in many ways. It might be said to be, though this is oversimple, a morality of masters. Guilt is almost unknown in Gorean morality, though shame and anger are not." - MARAUDERS OF GOR, Pg. 8 "The morality of slaves says, "You are equal to me; we are both the same"; the morality of masters says, "We are not equal; we are not the same; become equal to me; then we will be the same." The morality of slaves reduces all to bondage; the morality of masters encourages all to attain, if they can, the heights of freedom. I know of no prouder, more self-reliant, more magnificent creature than the free Gorean, male or female; they are often touchy, and viciously tempered, but they are seldom petty or small; moreover they do not hate and fear their bodies or their instincts; when they restrain themselves it is a victory over titanic forces; not the consequence of a slow metabolism; but sometimes they do not restrain themselves; they do not assume that their instincts and blood are enemies and spies, saboteurs in the note of themselves; they know them and welcome them as part of their persons; they are as little suspicious of them as the cat of its cruelty, or the lion of its hunger; their desire for vengeance, their will to speak out and defend themselves, their lust, they regard as intrinsically and gloriously a portion of themselves as their hearing or their thinking." - MARAUDERS OF GOR, Pg. 8-9 "Many Earth moralities make people little; the object of Gorean morality, for all its faults, is to make people free and great. These objectives are quite different it is clear to see. Accordingly, one would expect that the implementing moralities would, also, be considerably different." - MARAUDERS OF GOR, Pg. 9 * * * "In contrast with the morality of the ancient Athenians, a morality of heroism and mastery, Christian morality has made the bland, mediocre person the moral exemplar. Worst of all, the Christian moral vision emphasizes abstaining from such 'selfish' concerns. The person who does essentially nothing with his or her life but has avoided 'sin' might merit heaven, on the Christian view, while a creative person may be deemed 'immoral' for refusing to follow 'the herd.' This, Nietzsche protests, is backward, and it will lead (and has led) to the downfall of the human race. According to Nietzsche, many if not most of the prohibitions of Judeo-Christan (and Kantian) ethics are 'leveling' devices that favor the weak and mediocre and put more talented and strong spirits at a disadvantage. Accordingly, Nietzsche defends a view 'beyond good and evil,' beyond our tendencies to pass moralistic judgments on our own and other's behavior, toward a more creative psychological and naturalistic perspective." Between Science and Religion: Modern Philosophy and the Enlightenment From - A Short History of Philosophy Pg. 234 - Robert Solomon & Kathleen Higgins Slave Morality vs Master Morality "Nietzsche pointed out that two moral systems have been apparent throughout history - that of enslaved peoples and that of the elite who have traditionally ruled - and that each system has had its own moral code. The slave morality of the weak requires them to accept subjugation and obedience to the master race. The master morality consists of the ethics of the aristocratic class (rulers and noblemen), dedicated to combat, adventure, victory. For these men, peace comes only with the conquest of their opponents who must then acknowledge the natural right of the strong to rule the weak. The principle that might makes right, said Nietzsche, is the verdict of nature, in contrast to civilization (Christian and Jewish that is) which has opposed this ethic with one of humility and compassion. The traditional Judeo-Christian culture is appropriate, Nietzsche insisted, only for slaves. Nietzsche accused Judeo-Christian religious leaders of using religion as a means of turning natural moral values upside down, so that the masters became the slaves, and the slaves became the masters. The slaves, said he, became priests representing the omnipotent God and threatened their masters with divine punishment unless they, the masters, accepted a humble, servile role as obedient servants of the slaves. Nietzsche called for a revaluation of all values." Naturalistic Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche From - Ideas of the Great Philosophers Pg. 50 - William Sahakian and Mabel Sahakian
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Arius of Treve	Condemnation of Herd Morality	#2	[url]	[-]
Posts: 522 10/16/01 09:04:37 Moderator	"What Nietzsche sometimes condemns as 'herd morality' he also describes as 'slave morality,' a morality fit for slaves and servants. Although there are strong suggestions of this view in some of Nietzsche's earlier works (Daybreak and Human, All Too Human), it is first fully stated in Beyond Good and Evil, and later more thoroughly worked out in On the Genealogy of Morals. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche boldly announces that 'wandering through the many subtler and coarser moralities which have so far been prevalent on earth . . . I finally discovered two basic types, . . . master and slave morality.' He immediately adds that these two usually intermingle and function together in all sorts of complex ways, and that they even coexist 'within a single soul.' This simple dichotomy belies Nietzsche's own insistence on subtlety and complexity, to be sure, but in the Genealogy he makes it quite clear that what he is giving us is a 'polemic,' an oversimplified but brutally thought-provoking way of looking at morality. Morality, in the singular sense presented in the Bible and defended by Kant, is slave morality. In its most crude form it consists of general principles imposed from above (by the rulers or by God) that yoke and constrain the individual. In its subtler and more sophisticated forms, that external authority is relocated internally - in the faculty of reason, for example. But what is most characteristic of Morality in either its crude or its sophisticated forms is that it is mainly prohibitive and constraining rather than inspiring. Kant may have been 'awed' by 'the Moral Law within,' but the Categorical Imperative itself, as he spells it out in several general formulas, consists mainly of implicit 'Thou shalt nots' ('Only act such that you would have others in the same circumstances act in the same way,' 'always treat people as ends and never as means only') The ultimate test of a maxim, according to Kant, is whether when universalized it is something that logically cannot be done. Nietzsche, of course, thinks that universalization is utterly irrelevant to virtue. Indeed, insofar as it can be universalized (or even generally described!) a virtue is diminished or destroyed. Master morality, by contrast, is an ethics of virtue, an ethics in which personal excellence is primary. But personal excellence is not to be contrasted with (or set in opposition to) personal happiness, as obligation so often is. Achieving excellence is precisely what makes one happy, according to both Nietzsche and Aristotle. To grudgingly fulfill one's obligations, at some cost to one's own goals and satisfaction, makes one unhappy. (Righteousness is a poor substitute for happiness.) The 'master' takes as his or her morality (in the anthropological sense) just those values, ideals, and practices that are personally preferable and suitable. The 'master' is epitomized neither by the overly genteel Aristotelian gentleman nor by the overly brutal Homeric heroes but by the very civilized yet still sufficiently Dionysian Greeks of the Golden Age. Master morality takes as its watchword "Become who you are,' and whether or not one turns out to be like anyone else, or even whether or not one is acceptable to others, are matters of no concern. It is the masters. Nietzsche tells us, who establish the meaning of 'good.' The masters use this term to refer to what they see as admirable, desirable, satisfying, and, in fact, to refer to themselves. (The bombastic Roman general in the musical A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum sings out proudly, 'I am my own ideal!') They thus recognize the distinctions between what is good and what is bad, but the latter refers only to deficiencies of the good, what is frustrating or debilitating, to failure, or inadequacy, to what is other than themselves, their tastes, their virtues, and to others who fail or fall behind. No principles, rulers, or gods are necessary to make the distinction, which arises from the ideals and desires of the masters themselves. Putting it simply, one might summarize master morality as 'being myself, and getting what I want,' with the understanding that what one is and what one wants may be quite refined and noble. (To interpret 'getting what I want' as an expression of selfishness reflects an impoverishment of desire, a sure sign of slave morality.) Not getting what one wants is bad, not necessarily in any larger sense (such as causing disastrous consequences for the community, or violating God's laws and inviting divine retribution) but simply because it falls short of one's own aspirations and ideals. For the slaves, by contrast, getting what one wants is just too difficult, too unlikely, too implausible. Slaves do not like themselves, so the idea of becoming who you are is not particularly appealing. Slaves ultimately do not value getting what one wants but, in a perverse yet readily comprehensible sense, not getting what one wants. Their virtue lies not in being themselves but in not being the other, the master, the privileged, the oppressor. The masters see the slaves as pathetic, as miserable, as unhappy, both because they don't get what they want and because what they want is often so petty. But the slaves do not see themselves that way. They see themselves as deprived. They see themselves as oppressed. They see themselves, in modern terms, as victims. Nor do they see the masters as merely happy and fulfilled. The slaves see them as oppressors, as people with the wrong values, the wrong ideals, the wrong ideas about living. Thus, in the long history of Morality there came about a most remarkable 'revaluation of values,' according to Nietzsche. First the ancient Hebrews, then the early Christians, turned master morality on its head, declaring that the very values and ideals that masters took to be the heart of their ethics were in fact offensive, first to God, then secondarily to God's righteous believers. Getting what you want, rather than being the standard of ethics, is the root of all evil. In slave morality, the simple distinction between good and bad gets replaced by the metaphysical distinction between good and evil. The masters' distinction between good and bad simply refers to getting versus not getting what one wants, fulfilling versus not fulfilling one's aspirations. The slaves' distinction between good and evil refers, instead, to external and 'objective' standards, God's will and principles of reason. Nietzsche sees in this reformulation of values an 'act of . . . spiritual revenge' -- 'The wretched alone are the good; the suffering, depraved, sick, ugly alone are pious, alone are blessed by God . . . and you, the powerful and noble, are, on the contrary, the evil, the cruel, the lustful, the insatiable, the godless to all eternity, and you shall be in all eternity unblessed, the accursed, and damned!' -- It is in contrast to the sometimes bloated pretensions of philosophy, theology, and metaphysical dogma that simple appeals to motives and emotion gain their force. In attacking Christianity and Judeo-Christian morality, Nietzsche does not remain on the same level of esoteric abstraction as his religious and moral antagonists. What he does instead is to dig under them. What could be more effective against the self-righteous pronouncements of some philosophers and theologians than an ad hominem argument that undermines their credibility, that reduces their rationality and piety to petty personal envy or indignation? What could be more humiliating for a morality that incessantly preaches against selfishness and self-interest than the accusation that it is in fact not only the product of impotent self-interest but hypocritical as well? And what could be a more effective argument against theism than ridiculing the psychosociological ground out of which such a belief has arisen? Such humiliation is Nietzsche's objective in his psychological guerrilla war against Christianity and Judeo-Christian bourgeois Morality. Nietzsche wants to shock us. He wants to offend us. He wants us to see through the rationalized surface of traditional Morality to its historical genealogy, the actual human beings who lie behind it. Like Hegel, his great misunderstood predecessor, he holds that one can truly understand a phenomenon only when one understands its origins, its development, and its overall place in human consciousness. But understanding a phenomenon, in this sense, does not always lead to further appreciation. Nietzsche contends that what we call 'Morality' originated among actual slaves, the miserable Lumpenproletariat of the ancient world (a term introduced by Marx to denote the lowest classes of society). Morality continues to be motivated by the servile and resentful emotions of those who are 'poor in spirit' and feel themselves inferior. 'Morality,' however brilliantly rationalized by Immanuel Kant as the dictates of Practical Reason or by the utilitarian philosophers as 'the greatest good for the greatest number,' is, according to Nietzsche, essentially the devious strategy of the weak to gain some advantage (or at least minimize their disadvantage) vis-a-vis the strong. What we call Morality, even if it includes (indeed emphasizes) the sanctity of life, displays palpable disgust for life, a 'weariness' with life, an 'otherworldly' longing that prefers some other, idealized existence to this one. To describe this, of course, is not to 'refute' the claims of Morality. Morality might still be, as Kant argued, the product of Practical Reason and such a matter of universalized principles. Nietzsche concedes that it may in fact be conducive to the greatest good for the greatest number, the public good. But to recognize that such obsessions with rational principles and general welfare are products and symptoms of an underlying sense of inferiority is certainly to take the glamour and the seeming 'necessity' out of Morality. The great moral philosophers have given us visions of the perfect society (Plato), portraits of the happy, virtuous life (Aristotle), formal analysis of Morality (Kant), and impassioned defenses of the principles of utility and equality (Mill). Nietzsche, by contrast, offers us a diagnosis, in which morals emerge as something mean-spirited and pathetic. The basis of slave morality, he tells us, is resentment, a bitter emotion based on a sense of inferiority and frustrated vindictiveness. It is a thoroughly reactive emotion, provoked by the successes of others. The contrast between slave morality and master morality ultimately comes down to this emotional difference: that the slave nurtures resentment until it 'poisons' him, while the master, noble and self-secure, expresses his feelings and frustrations. Although Nietzsche sometimes writes like an anthropologist, describing two alternative 'perspectives' on life, his continuous condemnation of resentment leaves little doubt as to which of the two 'moral types' he finds preferable. Nietzsche's 'genealogy' of morals is designed to make the novice reader uncomfortable with his or her own slavish attitudes, but it is also written to inspire a seductive sense of superiority, the urge to become a 'master.' These are dangerous attitudes, however, quite opposed to the edifying moral 'uplift' we usually expect from ethical treatises. Nietzsche's 'genealogy' is, in fact, only partially a genealogy; it is much more a psychological diagnosis. It does not include a very condensed and rather mythic account of the history and evolution of morals, but the heart of his account is a psychological hypothesis concerning the motives and mechanisms underlying that history and evolution. 'The slave revolt of morality begins,' Nietzsche tells us in Genealogy, 'when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values.' Modern critics might well dismiss such speculation as yet another version of the 'genetic fallacy.' (That is, the question is not the genesis or the motivation of morals but rather the validity of our moral principles.) But even Kant himself insisted that one cannot evaluate the 'moral worth' of an action without considering its intentions. An action performed out of noble sentiments is noble, even if the act itself is rather small and inconsequential. An action expressing vicious sentiments is vicious, even if the act itself turns out to have benign consequences. At least in part, ethics is made up of what one might generically call 'feelings' - or, better, what Kant called the 'inclinations' - which would include not only respect, a sense of duty, and the sweet (but suspicious) sentiments of sympathy and compassion, but also the nasty negative emotions of envy, anger, hatred, vengeance, and, especially, resentment." Master and Slave Morality From - What Nietzsche Really Said Pg. 108-115 - Robert Solomon & Kathleen Higgins
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Salamache	Herd Instinct and Morality	#3	[url]	[-]
Posts: 11 12/03/01 11:11:50	116 -- Herd Instinct -- Wherever we encounter a morality, we find evaluation and ranking of human drives and actions. These evaluations and rankings are always the expression of the needs of a community and herd: that which benefits it the most -- and second most, and third most -- is also the highest standard of value for all individuals. With morality the individual is instructed to be a function of the herd and to ascribe value to himself only as a function. Since the conditions for preserving one community have been very different from those of another community, there have been very different moralities; and in view of essential changes in herds and communities, states and societies that are yet to come, one can prophesy that there will yet be very divergent moralities. Morality is the herd-instinct in the individual. Friedrich Nietzsche The Gay Science -- Book Three
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Arius of Treve	From - "Beyond Good and Evil"	#4	[url]	[-]
Posts: 522 10/16/01 08:59:54 Moderator	[260] "Wandering through the many subtler and coarser moralities which have so far been prevalent on earth, or still are prevalent, I found certain features recurred regularly together, and were closely associated -- until I finally discovered two basic types and one basic difference. There are master-morality and slave-morality -- I add immediately that in all the higher and more mixed cultures there are also appear attempts at mediation between these two moralities; and yet more often the interpenetration and mutual misunderstanding of both, and at times, they occur directly alongside each other -- even in the same human being, within a single soul. The moral discrimination of values has originated either among a ruling group whose consciousness of its difference from the ruled group was accompanied by delight - or among the ruled, the slaves and dependents of every degree. In the first case, when the ruling group determines what is 'good,' the exalted, proud states of the soul are experienced as conferring distinction and determining the order of rank. The noble human being separates from himself those in whom the opposite of such exalted, proud states finds expression: he despises them. It should be noted immediately that in this first type of morality the opposition of 'good' and 'bad' means approximately the same as 'noble' and 'contemptible.' (The opposition of 'good' and 'evil' has a different origin.) One feels contempt for the cowardly, the anxious, the petty, those intent on narrow utility; also for the suspicious with their unfree glances, those who humble themselves, the doglike people who allow themselves to be maltreated, the begging flatterers, above all the liars: it is part of the fundamental faith of all aristocrats that the common people lie. 'We truthful ones' - thus the nobility of ancient Greece referred to itself. It is obvious that moral designations were everywhere first applied to human beings and only later, derivatively, to actions. Therefore it is a gross mistake when historians of morality start from such questions as: why was the compassionate act praised? The noble type of man experiences itself as determining values; it does not need approval; it judges, 'what is harmful to me is harmful in itself'; it knows itself to be that which first accords honor to things; it is value-creating. Everything it knows as part of itself it honors: such as morality is self-glorification. In the foreground there is the feeling of fullness, of power that seeks to overflow, the happiness of high tension, the consciousness of wealth that would give and bestow: the noble human being, too, helps the unfortunate, but not, or almost not, from pity, but prompted more by an urge begotten by excess of power. The noble human being honors himself as one who is powerful, also as one who has power over himself, who knows how to speak and be silent, who delights in being severe and hard with himself and respects all severity and hardness. 'A hard heart Wotan put into my breast,' says an old Scandinavian saga: a fitting poetic expression, seeing that it comes from the soul of a proud Viking. Such a type of man is actually proud of the fact that he is not made for pity, and the hero of the saga therefore adds as a warning: 'If the heart is not hear in youth it will never harden.' Noble and courageous human beings who think that way are furthest removed from that morality which finds distinction of morality precisely in pity, or in acting for others, or in desinteressement; faith in oneself, pride in oneself, a findamental hostility and irony against 'selflessness' belong just as definitely to noble morality as does a slight disdain and caution regarding compassionate feelings and a ''warm heart.' It is the powerful who understand how to honor; this is their art, their realm of invention. The profound reverence for age and tradition - all law rests on this double reverence - the faith and prejudice in favor of ancestors and disfavor of those yet to come are typical of the morality of the powerful; and when the men of 'modern ideas,' conversely, believe almost instinctively in 'progress' and 'the future' and more and more lack respect for age, this in itself would sufficiently betray the ignoble origin of these 'ideas.' A morality of the ruling group, however, is most alien and embarassing to the present taste in the severity of its principle and that one has duties to one's peers; that against beings of a lower rank, against everything alien, one may behave as one pleases or 'as the heart desires,' and in any case 'beyond good and evil' - here pity and like feelings may find their place. The capacity for, and the duty of, long gratitude and long revenge - both only among one's peers - refinement in repaying, the sophisticated concept of friendship, a certain necessity for having enemies (as it were, as drainage ditches for the affects of envy, quarrelsomeness, exuberance - at bottom, in order to be capable of being good friends): all these are typical characteristics of noble morality which, as suggested, is not the morality of 'modern ideas' and therefore is hard to empathize with today, also hard to dig up and uncover. It is different with the second type of morality, slave morality. Suppose the violated, oppressed, suffering, unfree, who are uncertain of themselves and weary, moralize: what will their moral valuations have in common? Probably pessimistic suspicion about the whole condition of man will find expression, perhaps a condemnation of man along with his condition. The slave's eye is not favorable to the virtues of the powerful: he is skeptical and suspicious, subtly suspicious, of all the 'good' that is honored there - he would like to persuade himself that even their happiness is not genuine. Conversely, those qualities are brought out and flooded with light which serve to ease existence for those who suffer: here pity, the complaisant and obliging hand, the warm heart, patience, industry, humility, and friendliness are honored - for here these are the most useful qualities and almost the only means for enduring the pressure of existence. Slave morality is essentially and morality of utility. Here is the place for the origing of that famous opposition of 'good' and 'evil': into evil one's feelings project power and dangerousness, a certain terribleness, subtlety, and strength that does not permit contempt to develop. According to slave morality, those who are 'evil' thus inspire fear; according to master morality it is precisely these who are "good' that inspire, and wish to inspire, fear, while the 'bad' are felt to be contemptible. The opposition reaches its climax when, as a logical consequence of slave morality, a touch of disdain is associated also with the 'good' of this morality - this may be slight and benevolent - because the good human being has to be undangerous in the slaves' way of thinking: he is good-natured, easy to deceive, a little stupid perhaps, un bonhomme. Wherever slave morality becomes preponderant, language tends to bring the words 'good' and 'stupid' closer together." Part Nine - What is Noble From - Beyond Good and Evil - Friedrich Nietzsche
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Arius of Treve	The Herd - "Let us all be weak, for I am weak."	#5	[url]	[-]
Posts: 522 08/17/01 22:57:32 Moderator	"'Surely, someday on Earth, said the man, 'the males will dare to be men?' 'I do not think so,' I said, 'save for rare individuals. The process of teaching, unconscious, subtle, pervasive, is too effective. It is not unusual for a woman to fear her womanhood; what is less generally recognized is that many men fear their own manhood; they conceal their blood; they pretend it does not exist; it is even dangerous, in such a society, to suggest that men consider honesty in such matters, to suggest that they dare to be men, to suggest that they might, if they wished, tear away their own chains. The weakest, the most trapped among them, are often the first, with hysteria, knowing they themselves are not strong enough to take their rightful freedoms, and envying others they fear might have the strength, to denounce such modest suggestions.' 'The weak,' said the man, 'are always those who fear the strong.' 'They fear, not strangely, a world in which not everyone is like themselves.' 'Let us all be weak, for I am weak,' smiled the man. 'Yes,' I said." - TRIBESMAN OF GOR, Pg. 75-76 "[The morality of Earth] lays great stress on equalities and being humble and being pleasant and avoiding friction and being ingratiating and small.... The Gorean morality on the other hand is more one of inequalities, based on the assumption that individuals are not the same, but quite different in many ways." - MARAUDERS OF GOR, Pg. 8 [861] "A declaration of war on the masses by higher men is needed! Everywhere the mediocre are combining in order to make themselves master! Everything that makes soft and effeminate, that serves the ends of the 'people' or the 'feminine,' works in favor of suffrage universel, ie., the dominion of inferior men. But we should take reprisal and bring this whole affair to light and to the bar of judgment." Part One - The Doctrine of Order of Rank Book Four: Discipline and Breeding From - The Will to Power - Friedrich Nietzsche [280] "The instinct of the herd considers the middle and the mean as the highest and most valuable: the place where the majority finds itself; the mode and manner in which it finds itself. It is therefore an opponent of all orders of rank, it sees an ascent from beneath to above as a descent from the majority to the minority. The herd feels the exception, whether it be below or above it, as something opposed and harmful to it. Fear ceases in the middle: here one is never alone; here one's own form of being is not felt as a reproach but as the right form of being; here contentment rules. Mistrust is felt towards the exceptions; to be an exception is experienced as guilt." Part Two - The Herd Book Two: Critique of Highest Values From - The Will to Power - Friedrich Nietzsche "We are alien to each other, and their virtues are even more distasteful to me than their falseness and their loaded dice. And when I lived with them, I lived above them. That is why they developed a grudge against me. They did not want to hear how someone was living over their heads; and so they put wood and earth and filth between me and their heads. Thus they muffled the sound of my steps: and so far I have beeen heard least well by the most scholarly. Between themselves and me they laid all human faults and weaknesses: 'false ceilings' they call them in their houses. And yet I live over their heads with my thoughts; and even if I wanted to walk upon my own mistakes, I would still be over their heads. For men are not equal: thus speaks justice. And what I want, they should have no right to want!" On Scholars From - Thus Spoke Zarathustra - Part II - Friedrich Nietzsche
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dahra	On The Friend	#6	[url]	[-]
Posts: 268 10/16/01 12:39:08	On The Friend "There is always one too many around me" - thus thinks the hermit. "Always one times one-eventually that makes two." I and me are always too deep in conversation: how could one stand if there were no friend? For the hermit the friend is always the third person: the third is the cork that prevents the conversation of the two from sinking into the depths. Alas, there are too many depths for all hermits; therefore they long so for a friend and his height. Our faith in others betrays in what respect we would like to have faith in ourselves. Our longing for a friend is our betrayer. And often love is only a device to overcome envy. And often one attacks and makes and enemy in order to conceal that one is open to attack. "At least be my enemy"-thus speaks true reverence, which does not dare ask for friendship. If one wants to have a friend one must also want to wage war for him: and to wage war, one must be capable of being an enemy. In a friend one should still honor the enemy. Can you go close to your friend without going over to him? In a friend one should have one's best enemy. You should be closest to him with your heart when you resist him. You do not want to put on anything for your friend? Should it be an honor for your friend that you give yourself to him as you are? But he sends you to the devil for that. He who makes no secret of himself, enrages: so much reason have you for fearing nakedness. Indeed, if you were gods, then you might be ashamed of your clothes. You cannot groom yourself too beautifully for your friend: for you shall be to him as an arrow and a longing for the overman. Have you ever seen your friend asleep - and found out how he looks? What is the face of your friend anyway? It is your own face in a rough and imperfect mirror. Have you ever seen your friend asslep? Were you not shocked that your friend looks like that? O my friend, man is something that must be overcome. A friend should be a master at guessing and keeping still: you must not want to see everything. Your dream should betray to you what your friend does while awake. Your compassion should be a guess - to know first whether your friend wants compassion. Perhaps what he loves in you is the unbroken eye and the glance of eternity. Compassion for the friend should conceal itself under a hard shell, and you should break a tooth on it. That way it will have delicacy and sweetness. Are you pure air and solitude and bread and medicine for your friend? Some cannot loosen their own chains and can nevertheless redeem their friends. Are you a slave? Then you cannot be a friend, Are you a tyrant? Then you cannot have friends. All-too-long have a slave and a tyrant been concealed in woman. Therefore woman is not yet capable of friendship: she knows only love. Woman's love involves injustice and blindness against everything that she does not love. And even in the knowing love of a woman there are still assault and lightning and night alongside light. Woman is not yet capable of friendship: women are still cats and birds. Or at best, cows. Woman is not yet capable of friendship. But tell me, you men, who among you is capable of friendship? Alas, behold your poverty, you men, and the meanness of your souls! As much as you give the friend, I will give even my enemy, and I shall not be any the poorer for it. There is comradeship: let there be friendship! Thus spoke Zarathustra. Thus Spoke Zarathustra Part I Friedrich Nietzsche
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Arius of Treve	A Clarification	#7	[url]	[-]
Posts: 522 08/17/01 22:20:42 Moderator	Master Morality and Slave Morality The title of this post is a subject often discussed in relation to Gorean philosophy. It is mentioned by name in the beginning of Maruaders of Gor, during a long bout of introspection done by Tarl. The basic concept itself comes from Friedrich Nietzsche, as has been shown in this thread. Norman develops this idea as a central theme within Gorean philosophy and contrasts Gor and Earth through it. But what is meant by the idea itself? First off... what is not meant is "morality" within a Master/slave relationship. The topic itself is not addressing Masters and slaves from the viewpoint of consensual relationship slavery, BDSM, legalized slavery, or any other notions what commonly come to mind when hearing those terms Online. It has little to do with these things and should not be confused as some sort of morality system to be followed by Gorean slave girls or indicative of them. The "Morality of the Master" is supported and promoted by Gorean philosophy, while the "Morality of the Slave" is refuted. What is being addressed by these terms is the seeming moral systems of various societies. Nietzsche choose the specific titles because in his eyes they were reflective of each particular system. The "Morality of the Slave" is a moral system of ressentiment and self-denial - "Thou shalt not's" - currently depicted by our present day society... civilization based upon Judeo-Christian (Kantian) ethics. But not just present day society... basically society as based upon these ethical systems for as long as they have existed and dominated thought (returning to western society of 200 years ago is not the embracing of an age more in tune with Gorean philosophy). The "Morality of the Master" is a moral system of personal excellence and affirmation - "Become who you are" - seen by Nietzsche as being epitomized by the Heroic Age of the Greeks and portrayed by Norman as being the ideal of Gorean society (ideal, not always reality, for the whole of any society - its people - will never be all fitting to the ideal. In the case of the Gorean novels, Norman uses examples clearly contrasted with the ideal of Gorean philosophy as a tool to makes statements not only of what should be, but what should not). - Arius
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Bits on Nietzsche, Norman and Gorean Philosophy	08/17/01 21:07:39	Arius of Treve
To Conceive of Woman as a Possession	11/18/01 21:52:11	Arius of Treve
The Crumbling of Feminine Instincts	12/07/01 13:28:18	Arius of Treve
The Strength of the Weak	12/08/01 14:14:56	Brant
The Women who Master the Masters	01/04/02 12:16:45	Arius of Treve
Ecce Femme	02/04/02 19:16:30	dahra
Re: Ecce Femme	05/28/02 10:26:53	Hunter Garrick
Revaluation of All Values	11/10/01 12:18:53	Arius of Treve
Some Aphorisms	10/24/01 16:40:51	Brant
More Aphorisms	12/08/01 14:13:50	Brant
Men - To 'Live Dangerously'	10/17/01 21:20:52	Arius of Treve
Re: Men - To 'Live Dangerously'	01/17/04 20:39:36	JethroLomax
On Guilt	08/17/01 23:22:03	Arius of Treve
Master Morality and Slave Morality	08/17/01 22:05:43	Arius of Treve
Condemnation of Herd Morality	10/16/01 09:04:37	Arius of Treve
Herd Instinct and Morality	12/03/01 11:11:50	Salamache
From - "Beyond Good and Evil"	10/16/01 08:59:54	Arius of Treve
The Herd - "Let us all be weak, for I am weak."	08/17/01 22:57:32	Arius of Treve
On The Friend	10/16/01 12:39:08	dahra
A Clarification	08/17/01 22:20:42	Arius of Treve
On Pity	08/17/01 21:40:03	Arius of Treve
On The Pitying	10/16/01 12:18:48	dahra
Why So Hard?	08/17/01 21:24:12	Arius of Treve
Strike Hard Roots Around Hard Rocks.	10/18/01 10:18:03	Salamache
Against the Slanderers of Nature	01/22/02 08:37:29	Salamache
Pride in the Spirit	01/22/02 09:14:18	Salamache
Re: Bits on Nietzsche and Norman	12/22/03 22:12:09	JethroLomax

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